THE BIG TECH CRACKDOWN
Since Xi Jinping assumed the role of President of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party has asserted itself even more in the everyday lives of Chinese citizens. This has become apparent in the way that the country monitors most, if not all, facets of technology and communications. The impact to the day-to-day operations of Crossing Borders cannot be overstated as all of our means of communicating with our staff in the country are monitored.
Data is now considered a fundamental building block of the Chinese economy. The China Academy of Information and Communication Technology has estimated to account for 38.6 percent of China’s GDP in 2020 alone. As it grows its economic importance, China is setting an early precedent to exercise state control over data activities in the private sector as a matter of national security.
The Cyberspace Administration of China (or CAC) started out policing China’s internet for pornography and sensitive online content. The CAC has grown into a powerful gatekeeper in charge of China’s enormous censorship apparatus. From reviewing user data at small private tech companies to the Chinese ride-hailing giant, Didi, who recently announced their decision to delist from the NYSE following CAC’s cybersecurity review, no Chinese government agency has held such explicit gatekeeper powers in the past. Beyond public investigations and reviews of private user data, ongoing surveillance of personal data, including 150,000 pieces of “harmful” online content related to the support of celebrities on social media platforms were removed by the CAC, while more than 4,000 accounts related to fan clubs were punished earlier this year.
China’s Data Security Law, which took effect on September 1, 2021, claims that all data activities both within and outside China’s borders that are considered to be “relevant to China’s national security” will fall within China’s jurisdiction and its strict regulations. China plans to tightly regulate their data and tech industries for the foreseeable future and has made those intentions very clear to its citizens and the watching world. In order to enable law enforcement agencies to more closely monitor data and users, the use of a national electronic ID authentication system has been proposed. Further research into China’s digital economy in areas such as artificial intelligence, big data and cloud computing have also been included in the plan.
In short, China is preparing the way to make monitoring and censorship even more accessible and powerful for its government.
SOCIAL MEDIA AND APPS FOR SURVEILLANCE
Chinese social media platforms detect keywords and phrases and routinely censor content that are considered to be politically or culturally sensitive. Although it is not clear as to whether such decisions are directed by the government or are made internally, there is evidence that censorship decisions based on referenced keywords closely echo government policies. For example, to prevent social instability, all content related to Covid-19, a wide range of speech about the outbreak of Covid-19, including neutral information about the virus, were automatically taken down from WeChat and other online platforms.
WeChat is the most widely used, government-approved messaging app in China and government control through keyword-censorship is no secret to its 800 million users. It is reported that content triggering censors are continually updated as the category of sensitive material broadens. Citizen Lab, a research group from the University of Toronto, has experimented on WeChat’s response to messages related to China’s targeting of 709 human rights lawyers in China, including “detaining, questioning, and disappearing them” following the 709 Crackdown which started on July 9, 2015. The group attempted to send a message containing keyword combinations related to politically sensitive topics, and these messages were simply not sent while users remained unaware of such automatic censorship.
Citizen Lab found that “WeChat performs censorship on the server-side, which means that messages sent over the app pass through a remote server that contains rules for implementing censorship.” They further identified the following keyword combinations, among others, that trigger censorship:
(Deutsche Welle + (Washington) Demands Beijing to (Curb) North Korea + China Is Discontent); 德国之声+要求北京对朝鲜+中国大为不满
(same as above, in Traditional Chinese characters); 德國之聲+要求北京對朝鮮+中國大爲不滿
(Low-grade Calculation + Indirectly Criticize China's Sanctions (against North Korea) + Korean Central News Agency); 低级的算法+暗批中国制裁+朝中社署名
In addition to keywords in Simplified Chinese, which is the official language of the Chinese Communist Party, at least two other types of written characters, including Traditional Chinese and English, are also detectable and subject to censorship by WeChat.
WHAT IT MEANS FOR NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS AND OUR OPERATIONS IN CHINA
Since China’s censors have begun tightening their grip on messaging platforms including WeChat, any operation related to the aiding and abetting of North Korean defectors in China which passes through WeChat can potentially be monitored and traced by the government. Helping North Korean defectors in China is still an illegal and punishable crime.
A prime example of this is Chinese lawyer Chen Qiushi’s case, whose viral videos covering the Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan had subsequently led to his WeChat account being taken down, his questioning by the police and subsequent arrest. Another incident describes a Beijing-based user whose WeChat account was blocked before he was taken in for questioning for criticizing China’s foreign policy. The user explained that police officers obtained and held printouts of his private WeChat chat logs during the two-hour interrogation.
While tech companies have yet to announce how they plan to reform the handling and protection of users’ personal data, it is undisputed that China’s swiftly evolving state surveillance renders fewer and fewer private spaces for Crossing Borders to communicate with North Korean defectors in China and run our operations that are deemed illegal in China. In other words, authorities who once had to use informants to find out about our work and the identity of those under our care in China can now rely on a vast web of new technology.
